Selected Articles:
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- Levine, A., 2010 (forthcoming), "Introduction. ISI 2007: Perspectives on Interactivism", New Ideas in Psychology
Abstract
Introduces the contributions to a special issue of New Ideas in Psychology featuring participants to the Interactivist Summer Institute, 2007.
- Levine, A., 2009, "Partition Epistemology and Arguments from Analogy," Synthese 166: 593-600.
Abstract
Nineteenth and twentieth century philosophies of science have consistently
failed to identify any rational basis for the compelling character of scientific analogies. This failure is particularly worrisome in light of the fact that the development and diffusion of certain scientific analogies, e.g. DarwinÕs analogy between domestic breeds and naturally occurring species, constitute paradigm cases of good science. It is argued that the interactivist model, through the notion of a partition epistemology, provides a way to understand the persuasive character of compelling scientific analogies without consigning them to an irrational or arational context of discovery.
- Novoa, A., and A. Levine, 2009, "Darwinism", in Susana Nuccetelli, et al., eds., Blackwell Companion to Latin American Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell.
Abstract
We trace the philosophical importance of Darwinism in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Latin American philosophy, with particular attention to the work of Jose Marti, Jose Rodo, and Euclides da Cunha.
- Levine, A., 2005, "Conjoining Mathematical Empiricism with Mathematical Realism: Maddy's Account of Set Perception Revisited," Synthese.
Abstract
Penelope Maddy's original solution to the dilemma posed by Benacerraf in his (1973) "Mathematical Truth" was to reconcile mathematical empiricism with mathematical realism by arguing that we can perceive realistically construed sets. Though her hypothesis has attracted considerable critical attention, much of it, in my view, misses the point. In this paper I vigorously defend Maddy's 1990 account against published criticisms, not because I think it is true, but because these criticisms have functioned to obscure a more fundamental issue that is well worth addressing: in general--and not only in the mathematical domain--empiricism and realism simply cannot be reconciled by means of an account of perception anything like Maddy's. But because Maddy's account of perception is so plausible, this conclusion raises the specter of the broader incompatibility of realism and empiricism, which contemporary philosophers are frequently at pains to forget.
- Levine, A., 2001, "Individualism, Type Specimens, and the Scrutability of Species Membership," Biology and Philosophy 16.
Abstract
The view that species are individuals, as developed by Ghiselin and Hull, has been touted as explaining the role of type specimens in taxonomy. The kinship of this explanation with the Kripke-Putnam theory of names has long been recognized. In light of this kinship, however, Hull's account of type specimens can be seen to entail two related inscrutability problems--unreasonable limits placed on the nature and extent of biological knowledge. An appreciation for these problems invites us to consider the proper relation between metaphysical and epistemological inquires in the philosophy of science.
- Levine, A., 2000, "Which Way Is Up? Thomas S. Kuhn's Analogy to Conceptual Development in Childhood," Science and Education 9, 107-122
Abstract
In the Preface to his Structure Of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas S. Kuhn let it be known that his view of scientific development was indebted to the work of pioneering developmental psychologist Jean Piaget. Piaget's model of conceptual development in childhood, on which the child passes through several discontinuous stages, served as the template for Kuhn's reading of the history of a scientific discipline, on which mutually incommensurable periods of normal science are separated by scientific revolutions. The analogy to conceptual change in childhood pervades Kuhn's corpus, serving as the central motif in his well-known essays, 'A Function for Thought Experiments' and 'Second Thoughts on Paradigms'. But it is deeply problematic. For as a careful student of Piaget might note, Piaget, and the developmental psychologists he inspired, relied on the same analogy, but with the order of epistemic dependencies reversed. One begins to worry that Kuhn's use of the analogy, and its subsequent re-use by developmental psychologists, sneaks a vicious circularity into our understanding of important processes. This circularity is grounds for some concern on the part of science educators accustomed to employing such Kuhnian notions as 'incommensurability' and 'paradigm'.
- Levine, A., 1999, "Scientific Progress and the Fregean Legacy," Mind and Language 14, 3, 263-290
Abstract
Twentieth century philosophy of science has been dominated by a view of language with a strong prejudice against psychology, even while empirical psychology has moved away from the nineteenth century philosophical psychology against which the prejudice was originally directed. This legacy is shown to dominate even in recent Kripke-inspired efforts toward new theories of meaning. Its influence is argued to undermine prospects for making sense of such phenomena as scientific progress. Avoiding this consequence requires that we pursue a psychologically informed theory of meaning.
- Levine, A., and M. Bickhard, 1999, "Concepts: Where Fodor Went Wrong," Philosophical Psychology 12, 1, 5-23
Abstract
In keeping with other recent efforts, Fodor's CONCEPTS focuses on the metaphysics of conceptual content, bracketing such epistemological questions as, "How can we know the contents of our concepts?" Fodor's metaphysical account of concepts, called "informational atomism," stipulates that the contents of a subject's concepts are fixed by the nomological lockings between the subject and the world. After sketching Fodor's "what else?" argument in support of this view, we offer a number of related criticisms. All point to the same conclusion: Fodor is ultimately not merely bracketing the epistemology of conceptual content; his theory makes answers to the epistemological questions impossible.
- Levine, A., and S. Weinberg, 1999 "T.S. Kuhn's 'Non-Revolution': An Exchange," New York Review of Books XLVI, 3 (Feb. 18, 1999), 49
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